Among the most philosophically dense and programmatic passages in the Advaita Vedānta tradition is the opening Adhyāsa Bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya, traditionally placed at the head of his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. Far from being a mere preliminary remark, this bhāṣya functions as a foundational prolegomenon (upodghāta) to the entire Advaitic enterprise. It sets out not only the diagnosis of saṃsāra but also the epistemological conditions under which philosophical inquiry, scriptural interpretation, and even the pursuit of liberation become intelligible. Central to this prolegomenon is the concept of adhyāsa, the mutual superimposition of the Self (ātman) and the non-Self (anātman), which Śaṅkara famously identifies with avidyā itself.
One of the most serious objections Śaṅkara anticipates in this context is the charge of adhyāsa–asaṃbhāvanā, the alleged impossibility of adhyāsa itself. If this objection were to stand, the Advaitic explanation of saṃsāra would collapse at its foundation. This essay seeks to examine this objection and Śaṅkara’s response to it in detail, with particular attention to what Śaṅkara means when he asserts the operative reality of adhyāsa in experience. The guiding question will be whether Śaṅkara is claiming that adhyāsa is positively given in experience, and if so, in what sense such a claim can be sustained without contradicting his own epistemological commitments.
The Pūrvapakṣa: The Alleged Impossibility of Adhyāsa
The pūrvapakṣin raises a challenge that is both epistemological and ontological. Adhyāsa, as defined by Śaṅkara, involves the superimposition of the attributes of one thing upon another, specifically the superimposition of the body, senses, mind, and their properties upon the Self, and conversely, the superimposition of consciousness and subjectivity upon the non-Self. The objector argues that such superimposition presupposes that both relata must be objects of cognition. In familiar cases of illusion, such as mistaking a rope for a snake or mother-of-pearl for silver, both the substratum and the superimposed entity are available to perception or memory. Superimposition, on this account, is intelligible only where there exists a common epistemic field in which two object-presentations can be confused.
The pratyagātman, however, does not seem to fit this model. It is not an object among objects; it is not presented “in front” (puro’vasthita) as something perceived or conceived; it is said to be aviṣaya, not an object of any pramāṇa. If this is so, how can attributes belonging to objects—such as agency, enjoyership, size, gender, action, or even knowerhood—be superimposed upon it? The pūrvapakṣin thus concludes that adhyāsa involving the Self is impossible in principle, and that saṃsāra must therefore have some other explanation.
This objection is not trivial. It strikes at the heart of Advaita’s claim that bondage is not a real transformation of the Self but a cognitive error. If adhyāsa itself is incoherent, the entire framework of error, ignorance, and liberation becomes suspect.
Śaṅkara’s First Response: The Self Is Not Absolutely Non-Objectifiable
Śaṅkara’s response proceeds with characteristic subtlety. He begins by qualifying the claim that the Self is aviṣaya. The Self, he says, is not non-objectifiable in an absolute or unqualified sense (na tu ayam ekāntena aviṣayaḥ). The reason for this lies in the peculiar mode of givenness of the Self. While the Self is not an object in the manner of external entities, it is nevertheless immediately evident (aparokṣa) and is the referent of the first-person notion (asmad-pratyaya-viṣayatva). The awareness “I am” does not arise through inference, testimony, or perception of an object; it is self-revealing and ever-present.
Śaṅkara is careful here not to collapse the distinction between subject and object. He does not claim that the Self becomes an object in the ordinary sense. Rather, he insists that the Self is not epistemically absent. It is precisely because the Self is manifest as the locus of the “I” that superimposition becomes possible. If the Self were utterly inaccessible or unknown, there would be no site upon which error could occur. The pūrvapakṣin’s mistake lies in equating non-objectifiability with non-manifestness.
This move already undermines the force of the objection. Adhyāsa does not require that both terms be objects in the same way; it requires only that there be some form of presence or manifestation that allows for misattribution. The Self, though not an object, is the ever-present ground of manifestation.
The Rejection of the “Puro’vasthita” Rule
Śaṅkara then addresses directly the implicit rule assumed by the objector, namely that superimposition can occur only upon something that is presented “in front” as an object. He rejects this rule outright, stating that no such universal restriction exists. To illustrate the point, he introduces the well-known example of children superimposing qualities such as blueness or impurity upon the sky (ākāśa). The sky is not perceived as a bounded, tangible object in the same way as a pot or a cloth, yet erroneous predicates are commonly attributed to it.
The function of this analogy is often misunderstood. Śaṅkara is not suggesting that the sky and the Self are epistemologically identical. Rather, he is showing that the scope of adhyāsa is broader than the pūrvapakṣin allows. Superimposition does not require full objecthood, nor does it require direct perceptual confrontation. It is sufficient that something be vaguely or implicitly present within experience. In this respect, the sky serves as an intermediate case that loosens the rigid dichotomy between object and non-object assumed by the objector.
By extension, there is no contradiction in asserting the superimposition of non-Self attributes upon the Self, even though the Self is not an object of perception. The charge of impossibility (asaṃbhāvanā) thus fails.
Adhyāsa as Transcendental Error
At this point, a delicate interpretive issue arises. When Śaṅkara defends the possibility of adhyāsa and illustrates it through examples, is he claiming that adhyāsa is something directly observed or experienced as such? A superficial reading might suggest that adhyāsa is treated as an empirical fact, akin to perceptual illusion. However, such a reading would conflict with Śaṅkara’s repeated insistence that adhyāsa cannot be removed by ordinary means of knowledge and that it precedes all pramāṇa-based cognition.
The key to resolving this tension lies in recognizing the level at which Śaṅkara is operating. His argument is not empirical but transcendental. He is not saying that we observe adhyāsa as an object within experience; he is saying that experience as we know it is unintelligible without presupposing adhyāsa. All worldly transactions involving pramāṇa and prameya proceed only after presupposing this mutual superimposition called avidyā. Adhyāsa is not an item within experience; it is the structural condition that makes ordinary experience intelligible.
Adhyāsa as the Condition of Pramātṛ-hood
Śaṅkara further strengthens his position by analyzing the notion of the knower (pramātṛ). Knowledge requires a subject who knows through instruments such as the senses and the mind. The pure Self, characterized as unattached (asaṅga) and actionless, cannot by itself function as a knower. Knowerhood arises only when the Self is identified with the body, senses, and mind. This identification is itself adhyāsa.
Without the notions of “I” and “mine” with respect to the body and sense organs, there can be no operation of the pramāṇas. Perception presupposes sense organs; sense organs presuppose a body; the body presupposes an underlying locus; and the assumption of all of these as “I” or “mine” presupposes adhyāsa. Conversely, without pramātṛ-hood there can be no pramāṇa-activity, and without pramāṇa-activity there can be no empirical knowledge at all.
The Status of Śāstra and Mokṣa-Vyavahāra
A further implication of Śaṅkara’s position is that even scriptural discourse, including teachings about liberation, operates within the provisional framework of adhyāsa. All śāstras concerned with injunction, prohibition, and liberation presuppose the acceptance of adhyāsa. The operation of the intellect (antaḥkaraṇa) in philosophical inquiry, including the inquiry into the nature of the Self, is itself conditioned by adhyāsa. From the highest standpoint (pāramārthika), such inquiry is ultimately sublated, but from the empirical standpoint (vyāvahārika), it is unavoidable.
Experiential Assertions and the Nature of Adhyāsa
Statements such as “I am a man,” “I am tall,” “I see,” “I act,” or even “I know” involve the tacit identification of the Self with non-Self attributes. Even knowerhood is, according to Śaṅkara, a form of adhyāsa, since pure consciousness does not know in the instrumental, object-directed sense. These assertions do not present adhyāsa as an object of awareness; they arise within the state of adhyāsa. In this sense, adhyāsa is indeed evident in experience, but not as a distinct phenomenon; it is the implicit structure that undergirds all empirical experience.
Summarizing this diagnosis, Śaṅkara states:
अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम।
“We have said that [adhyāsa] is the cognition of one thing as another.”
Adhyāsa is therefore a cognitive error, not an ontological mixture or a metaphysical contamination of consciousness by matter. Everyday certitudes like “I am the body,” “I act,” “I enjoy,” and “I know” are spontaneous products of this unexamined cognitive framework.
The Remedy: Ātmaikatva-Vidyā
Having identified adhyāsa as the fundamental source of human suffering, Śaṅkara states:
अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये।
“For the abandonment of this cause of suffering, the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the Self [is required].”
The remedy is not ritual or action but vidyā, specifically ātmaikatva-vidyā, the knowledge of the non-dual unity of the Self. Since adhyāsa is a cognitive error, it can be sublated only by right discrimination (viveka), not ordinary intellectual activity, because the intellect presupposes the very adhyāsa it seeks to remove. Śaṅkara defines vidyā precisely:
तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः।
“They call vidyā the ascertainment of the real nature of the entity through discrimination.”
This viveka is not a psychological or volitional act, nor an analytic operation by a constituted subject. It is grounded in the self-revealing character of the Self itself. In this process, the non-Self is recognized as non-Self, and the Self as ever-free, non-dual consciousness. The sublation of adhyāsa is concomitant with this recognition (vastu-svarūpa-avadhāraṇa); it is not a subsequent effect but the very disappearance of error.
Adhyāsa as Pedagogical Method: Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati
Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati emphasizes that the roundabout structure of adhyāsa—initially assumed as existing and later sublated—is not merely a philosophical maneuver but constitutes the central pedagogical architecture of Advaita Vedānta. This is an asādhāraṇa-dharma, an extraordinary feature of Vedānta, which distinguishes its method of exposition from ordinary logical discourse.
The adhyāropa–apavāda methodology permits a controlled deployment of what might otherwise appear as a “double standard.” There is no need to prove adhyāsa logically at the outset nor to negate it prematurely. Rather, the process unfolds in stages: starting with the provisional acceptance of worldly experience (loka-sammati), followed by a gradual transition to the transcendental Vedāntic standpoint, where the provisional view is recanted. This method ensures that the learner is neither confused nor deprived of the cognitive scaffolding required to apprehend the Self.
Swamiji further argues that this approach must be applied even to higher-order debates, such as adhyāsa-saṃbhāvanā. Here, the pūrvapakṣin challenges the tenability of adhyāsa itself, while Śaṅkara establishes its indubitable operation in empirical and cognitive life. When Śruti-pramāṇa operates (tat tvam asi), the provisional reality of adhyāsa is gradually sublated, vindicating the pūrvapakṣin’s ultimate point from the Vedāntic perspective.
According to Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, adhyāsa itself is the central Vedāntic adhyāropa. Without first assuming its existence, it would be impossible to begin the sampradāna of ātmaikatva-vidyā. Examining adhyāsa through any lens other than the mūla-adhyāropa risks distorting the methodological integrity of the śāstra and bhāṣyas. Only within this provisional acceptance followed by sublation does Advaita Vedānta reveal its full coherence, both epistemologically and soteriologically.
This completes the analysis of Śaṅkara’s opening Adhyāsa Bhāṣya, showing how adhyāsa functions simultaneously as a transcendental diagnosis, a cognitive condition, and a pedagogical instrument, ultimately pointing toward the knowledge of non-dual Selfhood as both the remedy and the culmination of Advaitic inquiry.